Redistricting has become synonymous with political extremism and party warfare. Last year, legislators staged bizarre confrontations in Colorado and Texas over unprecedented attempts to change district lines in mid-decade.
But unlike many other states, in 2001 the Iowa Legislature was able to re-draw its congressional and state legislative districts with little controversy.
Since 1980, Iowa has used a non-partisan redistricting service, called the Legislative Service Bureau. Even though the state legislature twice rejected the Bureau's maps in 1981 and ultimately drew up its own, Iowa lawmakers have generally accepted the Bureau's proposals. Most importantly, no district voting lines have been drawn by the courts since the 1980 legislation was passed.
How the Iowa Redistricting Process Came About: The Iowa legislation was the result of more than two decades of conflict over the redistricting process.
Though Iowa's solution to the problem is distinctive, conflict over redistricting issues is not exclusive to the state. The revisions to Iowa's redistricting process evolved from decades of disparities in states across the country.
For example, prior to 1960, the state of Tennessee had failed to reapportion the state legislature for 60 years, despite population growth and redistribution. Consequently, the issue was for the first time taken to the courts in Baker v. Carr.
The case was brought by Charles Baker, a voter, against the state in federal district court (Joe Carr was a state official in charge of elections). Baker claimed that his vote was diluted as a result of the state's failure to reapportion and that it violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
The federal district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it could not decide a political question.
However, Baker appealed to the US Supreme Court, which ruled in 1962 that a case raising a political issue could be heard. This landmark decision set a precedent that allowed for the resolution of redistricting conflicts in court, and opened the way for numerous suits on legislative apportionment.
Table 1 shows a timeline of the landmark cases that followed, as well as the state-level legislation that resulted in Iowa's current redistricting process.
Table 1.
Timeline of Iowa’s Redistricting Revision Process
1962 – US Supreme Court ruled that a challenge to a redistricting plan
could be brought and resolved in court.
Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 (1962)
1964 – US Supreme Court ruled that redistricting plans that were not based
on population would be rejected.
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 US 1 (1964)
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US 533 (1964)
1968 – Iowa Constitution was amended to fulfill the constitutional mandate
to draw boundaries based on population and to provide a basis and time line for establishing state senatorial and representative districts following the federal decennial census.
Iowa Constitution, Article III, ‘’ 34 – 36.
Article III, Section 35 of the Iowa Constitution requires the General Assembly to
establish, by September 1 of the year following the decennial census, state
legislative districts for both the Senate and House.
If the General Assembly fails to enact legislation establishing Senate and House
districts that becomes law by September 15th of that year, the Constitution
provides that the Iowa Supreme Court shall establish the districts based on
constitutional requirements.
The Iowa Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over all litigation challenging an
apportionment plan enacted into law.
The Iowa Constitution further provides that legislative districts be apportioned based
on population and be of compact and contiguous territory.
1968 – The General Assembly adopted legislative plans for use in the 1970s
for House and Senate districts with overall range ratios of 1.13:1 in the Senate and 1.14:1 in the House. [1]
1972 – Iowa Supreme Court struck down the adopted 1968 plans and
redrew legislative districts for use in the 1970s. [2] The Court rejected the plans because they established too wide a variation in population without valid justification. The Court’s legislative districts were drawn with an overall range ratio of 1.0005:1 and 1.0009:1 for the Senate and House, respectively. [3]
1980 – Session of the Iowa General Assembly enacted legislation that
established a process for drawing legislative and congressional districts following each decennial census, beginning with the 1980 census. This procedure is codified in Iowa Code, chapter 42, and remains largely unchanged to this day.
How The Iowa Process Works: Under chapter 42 of the Iowa Code, enacted in 1980, the Iowa legislature has the final responsibility for enacting both congressional and state legislative district plans. However, the nonpartisan Legislative Services Bureau starts the process. The Bureau must develop up to three plans that can be accepted or rejected by the legislature.
The four criteria for the Bureau's plans, in descending order of importance, are:
1 - population equality,
2 - contiguity,
3 - unity of counties and cities (maintaining county lines and “nesting” house districts within
senate districts and senate districts within congressional districts), and
4 - compactness.
Chapter 42 specifically forbids the use of political affiliation, previous election results, the addresses of incumbents, or any demographic information other than population in creating the redistricting proposals.
In order to make as much information as possible regarding the redistricting process available to the public, three public hearings are required to be held on the first proposed plan from the Legislative Service Bureau. Additionally, Iowans can request paper maps depicting proposed district lines from the Bureau.
A commission consisting of four civilian members chosen by each caucus in the legislature and a fifth chairperson, chosen by the commission itself, is responsible for advising the Bureau, but only upon the Bureau's request. If the legislature does not approve the first three plans by the Bureau, it must itself approve a plan by September 1st, or the state Supreme Court will take responsibility for the state districts. The Governor has veto power over plans, regardless of how they are developed.
Political Impact: Since 1981, the Iowa Legislature has been quick to accept the Legislative Service Bureau's plans. Its recommendations may be inconvenient to incumbent state legislative leaders and members of Congress -- who are often placed in very competitive districts -- but that only highlights the perception that they are fair and non-partisan.
In fact, the Democratic-controlled legislature approved a plan in 1991 that left it vulnerable to competition; the Republicans now control both houses of the state legislature and four of five US House seats.
In 2001, the legislature did reject the Bureau's first plan for congressional districts, but accepted the second plan even though it forced some Republican incumbents to run in new districts.
Even those Congressmen and Iowa State Legislators who had to move from their districts, or chose to retire rather than run against other incumbents, support the process. They agree that it is best for the public.
Four out of Iowa's five new congressional districts are fairly evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans, mirroring the state's overall makeup. Only the 5th district, which runs down the state's western border, has a solid majority of Republican voters.
An advantage to the system in Iowa is that it resolves district lines early in the year - this allows parties to start recruiting candidates and also gives incumbents an opportunity to either move to another district or plan their retirement. In the 2002 election, two of Iowa's incumbent House members – Jim Leach (R) and Leonard Boswell (D) – had to pack up and move their homes in order to run in their new districts.
Across the nation, competitiveness of House races has hit an all-time low. As a Washington Post article by Joanne Dann reported, in the 2000 election only 57 of the House's 435 seats were decided by margins of 10 percent or less.
Reapportioning is a task left in most states to the legislature. As a result, most maps are drawn to protect incumbents or maximize one party's advantage at the polls.
Gerrymandering is having a profound impact on the political process. The practice sharply reduces the number of competitive elections to the US House of Representatives. For example, in 2002, only four challengers were able to defeat incumbent members of Congress, the lowest number in modern American history, according to political scientists Norman Ornstein and Thomas Mann.
Non-competitive districts lead to entrenched, polarized legislatures. Incumbents fear primary challenges from even-more-extreme partisans, not the other party, as a result of their "safe" districts.
By contrast, the non-partisan redistricting process has helped move politics in Iowa back toward the center. Most Iowa politicians know they must appeal not only to their party, but also to independent voters and voters affiliated with the other party. This inevitably leads to an emphasis on bipartisan cooperation and the public's best interest.
Links:
Centrists.Org's Electoral Reform Issue Summary
Centrists.Org's Public Trust Issue Summary (Basics)
For more information on Baker v. Carr, see the Legal Information Institute.
'Do It Yourself' Iowa Redistricting Maps (from the Legislative Service Bureau - 2001)
Iowa's Legislative Guide to Redistricting
Iowa's Redistricting Information
State of Iowa's Homepage
Iowa District Maps (from the Iowa General Assembly)
"The Republicans' Great Gerrymander" by Mark Gersh in the DLC's Blueprint Magazine discusses the effects of redistricting, competition and incumbent protection.
